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ENFORCING THE CLIMATE CHANGE ACT 
Jonathan Church 
 
Abstract: This paper examines the enforceability of the duties in the Climate Change Act 
2008 which require the UK’s GHG emissions to be reduced over time. Section B highlights 
how the Act’s other provisions must be interpreted so as to give proper support to these 
duties. The paper goes on, in Section C, to dispute objections that have been made to the 
duties’ enforceability – on the grounds that they are ‘target duties’ or ‘non-justiciable’– and 
argues that the courts can enforce them provided they adopt the amplified role which this new 
kind  of duty  requires;  by  seeking to  forge effective but  appropriate remedies.  Section D 
suggests what form these remedies might take. Final conclusions are described in Section E. 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The  UK  Climate  Change  Act  2008  (‘the  Act’)  has  been  described  as  ‘historic’, 1 
‘revolutionary’,2 a  ‘world  leader  in  climate  change  legislation’,3 and  ‘the  most  advanced 
climate change legislation in the world’.4 Arguably the Act’s most noteworthy feature is the 
legal duty requiring the reduction of UK greenhouse gas (‘GHG’) emissions by 80% by 2050 
as compared with 1990 levels.5 However, the legal effect of this duty is widely contested. 
This article defends the assertion made repeatedly by Government in pre -legislative scrutiny 
that this duty – alongside an equivalent duty to ensure certain GHG emission reductions in 
consecutive  5-yearly  budgetary  periods6 –  is  ‘legally  enforceable’.7 These  two  duties  are 
referred to as the Act’s ‘primary duties’ and the targets they relate to as the ‘2050 target’ and 
the ‘carbon budgets’, respectively. 
Before examining these primary duties, however, I assess the role of other duties in 
the  Act  which  govern  how  carbon  budgets  are  set  and  amended. 8 If these were to be 
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interpreted unduly softly then the primary duties would be vitiated, however enforceable they 
may be.  I then  argue that  the primary duties  should  be treated as  absolute duties  before 
considering whether they are enforceable in those terms. I find that widely proffered elements 
of non-justiciability would apply only falteringly to a judicial review claim in respect of what 
is a new kind of legal duty, and identify an alternative framework of analysis that may be 
more  useful.  My  conclusion  is  that  objections  to  enforceability  can  be  overcome  by  the 
development of suitable remedies, the possible form(s) of which I attempt to sketch out. 
Much  of  the  discussion  assumes  as  context  an  imagined  judicial  review  claim  brought 
explicitly to enforce the Act’s duties. However, this is certainly not to suggest that the Act is 
not capable of being invoked in other legal contexts or that it does not have wider influence 
or significance.9 
 
B.  SETTING AND AMENDING THE PRIMARY DUTIES’ TARGETS 
1.  The breadth of the Secretary of State’s discretion in principle and practice 
Progress towards the 2050 target is structured by 5-yearly budgetary periods which stretch 
from  2008-2012  to  2048-2052  (and,  in  theory,  beyond 10 ).  It  is  fundamental  to  the 
effectiveness of the Act that these carbon budgets do indeed chart an appropriate  – gradual 
and cost-effective – course which keeps its sights on the 2050 target. In principle, given the 
low political salience of climate change,11 it may well be tempting for successive Secretaries 
of State to set insufficiently ambitious carbon budgets which allow their trajectory, over time, 
to  deviate  increasingly  from  t he  2050  target. 12 Doing  so  would  make  the 2050  target 
increasingly unobtainable and could potentially endanger the sustainability of the Act itself. 
However,  in  practice,  the  Secretary  of  State’s  discretion  is  likely  to  be  constrained.  The 
                                                                                                                                                        
Parliament; central to keeping progress on track and thereby avoiding the eventual breach of a primary duty. In 
particular: ss 16, 18, 36, 37. 
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343. The possible influences of EU and human rights law are not considered in this article. 
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11 Lockwood (n 1) 1341-1343. 
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including the year 2020 (the third carbon budget, at 34%: s 5(1)(a) and The Climate Change Act 2008 (2020 
Target,  Credit  Limit  and  Definitions)  Order,  SI  2009/1258)  and  the  year  2050  (at  80%:  s  5(1)(b)).  Both 
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extent of that constraint is considered here, first in terms of the setting of carbon budgets and 
secondly in terms of their amendment. 
On a literal reading of the Act, the Secretary of State is afforded a relatively wide 
discretion in setting the level of carbon budgets, something he must do in the twelfth year 
before  the  start  of  each  budgetary  period.13 When  doing  so,  he  must  ‘take  into  account’ 
certain specified considerations.14 These include but are not limited to: scientific knowledge 
about climate change; economic and  fiscal circumstances; circumstances at European and 
international level; and the advice which the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) is 
required under the Act to provide. 15 However this duty to take into account does not, prima 
facie, translate into a duty to give particular weight to any one consideration over another. 16 
Similarly, while carbon budgets must be set ‘with a view to meeting’ the 2050 target,17 this 
wording could suggest that meeting the 2050 target must only be at least one of the Secretary 
of State’s objectives; it need not be his primary purpose.18 
Given the centrality of carbon budgeting to the Act as a whole, such discretion in 
setting carbon budgets would arguably be unduly wide. It would imply that the Secretary of 
State could prioritise (sa y) economic considerations above all others in setting a carbon 
budget, or another consideration not specified in the Act. 19 Could he take into account a 
personal doubt over the existence of anthropogenic climate change, or a belief that the 
consequences of  climate change would be beneficial to the UK? Might he adopt as his 
primary purpose in setting a carbon budget not the need to meet the 2050 target but the 
protection of the UK’s oil and gas industry?20 
In practice, we may expect that the Secretary of State’s discretion in setting carbon 
budgets would not be nearly so wide. His decisions will be constrained by the normal bounds 
of  illegality  which  require  that  factors  taken  into  consideration  in  any  decision  and  any 
purpose for which a decision is made, must not depart too far from the purpose ascribed to 
the  Act  as  a  whole. 21 Furthermore,  English  law  no  longer  elevates  a  ‘plain  meaning’ 
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15 s 9(1)(a). 
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interpretation of a statutory provision above a purposive reading of it.22 The purpose of the 
Act will be a matter of construction for the court.23 In this regard, the 2050 target has such a 
central prominence in the Act 24 (aside from it being section 1(1)) that it can be expected to 
play a key role in informing the court’s interpretation of the provisions described above; 
provisions which are plainly intended to support and facilitate the achievement of the 2050 
target. The particular clarity of the Climate Change Act’s purpose is another factor likely to 
constrain the discretion afforded to the Secretary of State in taking decisions pursuant to it. 
For these reasons, the hypothetical examples given above would, in all likelihood, be deemed 
to involve the unlawful exercise of discretion, even though they may not offend a literal 
reading of the Act. 
The weight that the Secretary of State is entitled to give to different considerations is 
also likely to be constrained by how far each consideration departs from the Act’s overall 
purpose. The Secretary of State will likely be required to take meeting the 2050 target as his 
primary consideration in setting a 2050 target, rather than it being one among many. 
Similar arguments apply to the Secretary of State’s power to amend a carbon budget once it 
has been set. Amendment is permitted if it ‘appears to the Secretary of State that, since the 
budget was originally set (…) there have been significant changes affecting the basis on 
which  the  previous  decision  was  made’.25 These  words  imply  that  the  presence  of  such 
‘significant changes’ will be determined subjectively by the Secretary of State; in other words 
that they are not ‘precedent facts’, the established absence of which could lead a court to 
quash a decision which has been based on their existence.26 However, such an interpretation 
has been doubted by the CCC. In 2011, when the level of th e fourth carbon budget (relating 
to the period 2023-2027) was set,27 the Government stated its intention to revisit it ‘by 2014’ 
–  and,  potentially,  to  ‘revise  up  our  budget’ 28 to  ensure  it  remained  aligned  with  the 
                                                 
22 Indeed,  statutory  interpretation  has  evolved  to  the  point  where  ‘literalism  should  give  way  to  purposive 
interpretation as a matter of course and not exception’: Jeff King, Judging Social Rights (CUP 2012) 197, citing 
Michael Zander, The Law Making Process (6th edn, CUP 2004) 132-149. 
23 Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997 (HL) [1030]. 
24 In addition, a description of section 1 forms the first sentence of the Act’s long title. 
25 s 21(2). Again, the CCC’s advice must be taken into account: s 22(1)(a). Note that similar provision is made 
for the amendment of the 2050 target – though in this case the ‘significant developments’ are restricted to those 
in scientific knowledge about climate change or European or international law or policy (ss 2(1)(a), 2(2)(a)).  
26 Jonathan Auburn, Jonathan Moffett and Andrew Sharland, Judicial Review; Principles and Procedure (OUP 
2013) 460: ‘It is almost inconceivable that a statutory provision phrased in [such] subjective terms … could ever 
give rise to an issue of precedent fact’ (citing R v Home Secretary ex parte Zamir [1980] AC 930 (HL) [948]). 
27 The Carbon Budget Order 2011, SI 2011/1603. 
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reductions trajectory of the EU Emission Trading Scheme.29 The original basis for the fourth 
carbon budget, as well as the ‘significance’ of any changes since, would have been factually 
and legally arguable. However, the CCC, as  the mandatory  consultee, repeatedly warned 
against any amendment to the budget.30 Importantly for current purposes, it did so in terms 
which treat the existence of ‘significant developments’ as an objective test: ‘[o]nly if there is 
a significant change [in the circumstances upon which the budget was set], demonstrable on 
the basis of evidence and analysis, can the budget be changed’.31 In the event, the fourth 
carbon budget was retained (not on the basis of this point of interpretation).32 It is likely, 
however, that the setting and maintenance of a fifth carbon budget – in 2016 – will be at least 
as  contentious  as  the  fourth,  in  which  case  such  legal  distinctions  may  take  on  greater 
practical importance and may be more forcefully contested. 
There will also be implied restrictions on the Secretary of State’s power to amend a 
carbon budget. It is submitted, for example, that the Act cannot intend that the Secretary of 
State would have greater freedom to amend a target than to set it in the first place, as this 
would  allow  the  provisions  governing  the  setting  of  carbon  budgets  to  be  effectively 
bypassed.33 It must be implicit therefore that the ‘significant developments’ changing the 
basis on which a target was originally set (whether they need to be established objectively or 
subjectively)  must  relate  to  –  and  in  some  sense  be  proportionate  to  –  the  proposed 
amendment to the target. The same may be said for any amendment of the 2050 target itself; 
such amendments being permitted on the basis of certain kinds of ‘significant developments’, 
provided  those  developments  ‘make  it  [the  particular  amendment]  appropriate’, 34 in  the 
context of the Act as a whole. 
                                                 
29 HM Government, Policy Statement: Implementing the Climate Change Act 2008: The Government’s proposal 
for setting the fourth carbon budget (May 2011) [17]. 
30 Letter from Lord Deben (CCC) to Ed Davey MP: 3 October 2013 <http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/Ed-Davey-October13-final.pdf> accessed 19 January 2015; Letter from Lord Deben 
(CCC) to Ed Davey MP 1 July 2013 (‘If there has been no change in circumstances, then the budget cannot be 
changed’) <http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/4CB_Call_for_Evidence_letter_E-
D_letter_1_July.pdf> accessed 19 January 2015. 
31 Committee on Climate Change, Meeting Carbon Budgets – 2014 Progress Report to Parliament, July 2014, 8 
<http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CCC-Progress-Report-2014_web_2.pdf>  accessed  19 
January 2015. 
32 Ed Davey MP, Written Ministerial Statement: Review of the Fourth Carbon Budget, 22 July 2014 
<http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-vote-office/July-2014/22%20July%202014/14-DECC-
CarbonBudget.pdf> accessed 19 January 2015. 
33 Indeed, the same matters are required to be taken into account in amending a carbon budget as they are in 
setting one, pursuant to s 10(1)(a). 
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The final constraint on all such decisions is democratic: carbon budgets are set and 
amended by Order, subject to ‘a resolution of both houses of Parliament’.35 If the carbon 
budget set by the Secretary of State differs from that recommended by the CCC,36 he must 
publish a statement setting out the reasons why. 37 This requirement is important from the 
perspective of public accountability. It is also important legally, since any reasons giv en by 
the Secretary of State may be subject to judicial review. At the very least, these reasons must 
not be Wednesbury unreasonable or made in bad faith. While this normally represents a very 
high threshold, it could be argued that it should be deployed i n its ‘anxious scrutiny’ form 
where ‘issues of public importance’ are raised (as would arguably be the case here).38 In 
short, the Secretary of State’s discretion in setting and amending carbon budgets should in 
practice be narrower than a literal reading would suggest, given the clear purpose of the Act 
as a whole.39 
2.  Policing and constraining this discretion in the courts 
In practice, the precise contours of the Secretary of State’s powers are likely to be established 
in the courts, specifically by a claim in judicial review. Whilst the susceptibility to judicial 
review of the Act’s primary duties is contested (as discussed in the sections that follow) there 
should in principle be no such obstacle as regards the enforcement of the Secretary of State’s 
discretion to set and amend carbon budgets.40 In particular, standing should not be an obstacle 
to a claim. 41 Questions of timing should be straightforward since a claim will relate to a 
specific decision by the Secretary of State or his failure to take a decision  required by a 
particular time. Similarly, the nature of a remedy, if awarded, is unlikely to be contentious. In 
practical terms, however, the result might represent something of a hollow victory  – if, say, 
an action/decision taken unlawfully was quashed,42 potentially to be re-taken lawfully to give 
the same result. Nonetheless, a court’s interpretation of some of the important provisions 
described above could have important consequences for the success of the Act in the long-
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36 ss 34(1)(a), 21(1)(a). 
37 ss 9(4), 22(7). 
38 David Thomas, ‘How Irrational Does Irrational Have To Be? Wednesbury in Public Interest, Non-Human 
Rights Cases’ [2008] JR 258, 265. 
39 Such an approach is exemplified by Padfield (n 23). 
40 The same can be said of ensuring that the Secretary of State adher es to the Act’s broader framework of 
governance – see (n 8). 
41 Colin T Reid, ‘A new sort of duty? The significance of “outcome duties” in the Climate Change and Child 
Poverty Acts’ [2012] PL 749, 757-8. 
42 Joint Committee on the Draft Climate Change Bill, Oral and Written Evidence (second report); Draft Climate 
Change Bill (2006-7, HL 170-II, HC 542-II) 239–240 (Evidence of Christopher Forsyth). UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
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term. In turn, this could help to ensure that carbon budgets chart an appropriate and cost-
effective course towards the 2050 target. 
 
C.  ENFORCING THE PRIMARY DUTIES 
Section 1(1) of the Act reads: ‘It is the duty of the Secretary of State to ensure that the net UK 
carbon account for the year 2050 is at least 80% lower than the 1990 baseline’. Section 
4(1)(b) is precisely equivalent: ‘It is the duty of the Secretary of State (…) to ensure that the 
net UK carbon account for a budgetary period does not exceed the carbon budget’. The ‘net 
UK carbon account’ and the ‘1990 baseline’ are defined terms which describe UK GHG 
emissions over, respectively, a particular time period, and in the year 1990.43 The ‘carbon 
budget’ is the amount set for the net UK carbon account in respect of each such period.44 As 
described in the introduction, these duties may well have wide legal influence. But, when 
considered  independently,  what  is  their  effect?  The  effective  legal  enforceability  of  the 
primary duties can be challenged from two angles: First, the primary duties do not carry the 
absolute meaning that a literal reading would imply. Second, even if the primary duties are 
given their literal meaning, the courts should not enforce them. These two propositions are 
considered – and contested – in turn.45 
1.   Taking the Primary duties literally 
Section 1(1) of the Act is ‘concise and clearly drafted’.46 It imposes a duty in unqualified 
language.47 As noted above, statutory interpretation routinely takes into account both literal 
and purposive meanings. However, in this case , the two align. A literal reading of section 
1(1) might even be said to embody the Act’s overall purpose. In spite of this, this ‘plain 
meaning’ interpretation has been contested. 
a)  A mere ‘target duty’? 
The strongest challenge to the primary duties being read as being ‘absolute’ was expressed by 
Christopher Forsyth, in his evidence to the Joint Committee: 
                                                 
43 ss 27, s.1(2). 
44 s 4(1)(a). 
45 As should become clear, I do not mean to imply that a court would cleanly separate  out these questions in the 
same way. 
46 Macrory (n 3) 307. 
47 One word in the primary duties does invite reflection: that the Secretary of State must ‘ensure’ the requisite 
fall in (GHG) emissions. However the use of this term is likely no more than a semantic admission that the 
Secretary of State cannot himself reduce GHG emissions. Only the ‘cumulative conduct of a wide range of 
parties’ can do so (Reid (n 41) 749). This conclusion is supported by the Explanatory notes to the Act which 
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[I]t is plain that [the s.1(1)] reduction is a target. … Inherent in the idea of a target is 
an  aspiration  not  a  guarantee  of  achievement.  At  most  then  this  clause  can  be 
interpreted as requiring the Secretary of State to use his or her best endeavours to 
achieve the target.48 
A target duty is a category of duties in respect of which (though it is not express) ‘[t]he 
authority is simply required to ‘do its best’’49 and ‘failure … without more does not constitute 
a justiciable breach’.50 There are reasons to seriously doubt Professor Forsyth’s conclusion 
that section 1(1) is a mere target. Primarily, it can be argued that the clear and unambiguous 
nature of the language simply speaks for itself: to ‘downgrade’ it in some way risks giving 
‘too little weight to the deliberate formulation of the duties’.51 Indeed, a similar criticism can 
be made of target duties more generally: ‘there is a danger that [they] will devalue the notion 
of a duty and permit Parliament to reassure the public with empty gestures and the executive 
to sit back and take no further notice’.52 
Peter  McMaster,  in  his  contemporaneous  analysis  of  the  Act  at  the  draft  stage 
concluded of section 1(1): ‘This is an unqualified duty to achieve a result, not an obligation 
merely to use best endeavours’.53 Indeed, it would have been quite possible for the primary 
duties to incorporate the statutory language of ‘best endeavours’54, or ‘to such extent as he 
considers necessary’55 if that reflected Parliament’s intention. The absence of such wording 
may be particularly significant given its appearance in other sections of the Act.56 Catherine 
Callaghan’s authoritative analysis of target duties leads her to conclude that ‘target duties are 
broadly framed’.57 But a comparison of the available examples of target duties58 with the 
primary duties in the Act shows that the latter are distinctly  more clear and precise than any 
examples of the former. Target duties always incorporate qualified language: either language 
explicitly carving out an area of discretion;59 or imprecise or value-laden phrases which do 
                                                 
48 Evidence to the Joint Committee (n 42) 238 (Evidence of Christopher Forsyth). 
49 Woolf and others (eds), de Smith’s Judicial Review (6th edn, OUP 2007) 259, quoting R v Islington LBC ex 
parte Rixon [1997] ELR 66 [69]. 
50 Catherine Callaghan, ‘What is a “Target Duty”?’ [2000] JR 184, 184. 
51 Reid (n 41) 753. 
52 Harry Woolf and others (eds), de Smith’s Judicial Review (7th edn, OUP 2013) 282. 
53 Peter McMaster, ‘Climate Change – Statutory Duty or Pious Hope’ (2008) JEL 20(1) 115, 116. 
54 eg National Audit Act 1983, s 6(5). 
55 eg National Health Service Act 1977, s 3(1). 
56 eg, ss 2, 6, 21 (‘if it appears to the Secretary of State that’). 
57 Callaghan (n 50) 185. 
58 Taken from Callaghan (n 50) 184-5; Woolf (n 49) 259; Auburn (n 26) 280. 
59 National Health Service Act 1977, s 3(1) (’to such extent as he considers necessary’); National Assistance Act 
1948, s 29(1) (‘to such extent as he may direct’). UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
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not  clearly  define  the  breadth  of  the  authority’s  discretion.60 The  primary  duties  contain 
neither – so in my view they should not be considered as target duties. 
Professor  Forsyth  also  appears  to  be  arguing  from  an  alternative  perspective.  He 
acknowledges that the primary duties are ‘broad, general duties’ but he categorises them as 
target duties nonetheless – since ‘a target is not something that you can guarantee, no one can 
guarantee you are going to hit the bull’s eye, it is something you would like to happen but 
you are not sure it will’.61 The argument is that a duty which it may not be possible to fulfil 
should  not  be  interpreted  literally.  Two  responses  can  be  made  to  this.  First,  Professor 
Forsyth may well be underestimating the capacity of the Secretary of State to fulfil this duty. 
Even if the ‘policy levers’ at the Secretary of State’s disposal might constrain his ability to 
‘ensure’ the necessary outcomes,62 it seems clear that a duty imposed on the Secretary of 
State is ‘imposed upon government as a whole’.63 It is difficult to imagine that the wider 
Government will lack capacity to reduce GHG emissions by the requisite amounts: it will, 
after all, have control of all policy levers. It should also be noted that proposals and plans to 
enable carbon budgets to be met must first be prepared fully 11 years in advance of the 
beginning of a budgetary period.64 The system of carbon budgeting is designed to ensure 
long-term  decisions  are  taken  to  chart  a  course  which  is  realistic  and  achievable. 
Furthermore, the annual reports mandated by the Act  – from the Secretary of State and the 
CCC65 – allow for regular policy and course adjustment. I would argue that the image of the 
Secretary of State aiming hopefully with a bow and arrow at some distant target is not apt. 
The Government as a whole will have been planning for many years how to achieve a result 
which is – as far as any result can be – within its extensive capacity to achieve.66 
Secondly, it is not clear on what theoretical basis Professor Forsyth is making this 
argument. Coke CJ in Dr Bonham’s Case (1610),67 stated: ‘when an Act of Parliament is … 
impossible to be performed, the common law will control it, and adjudge such act to be void’. 
                                                 
60 Education Act 1996, s 14 (‘sufficient schools’); National Assistance Act 1948, s 21 (‘persons … in need of 
care and attention’); Children Act 1989, s 17 (‘promote the welfare of children … who are in need’); Education 
Act  1944,  s  41(1)  (‘adequate  facilities’);  Fire  Services  Act  1947,  s  1(1)  (‘make  provision  for  firefighting 
purposes’); National Health Service Act 2006, s 1(1) (‘promotion of a comprehensive health service’); National 
Assistance Act 1948, s 29(1) (‘promoting the welfare of…’). 
61 Evidence to the Joint Committee (n 42) 2 (Evidence of Christopher Forsyth). 
62 ibid. 
63 Friends of the Earth v Secretary of State for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform [2008] EWHC 2518 
(Admin) [36]. 
64 This is the combined effect of ss 4(2)(b), 13(1), 14. 
65 ss 18, 36, 37. 
66 We  are,  after  all,  talking  about  reducing  GHG  emissions  –  a  logically  straightforward  (if  politically 
challenging) task as compared, for example, with the targets to reduce child poverty pursuant to the Child 
Poverty Act 2010 (see Reid, n 41). 
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However,  such  sentiments  are  now  understood  to  be  obsolete. 68 While  there  may  be 
exceptions to the classical formulation that ‘what Parliament at Westminster has enacted must 
always be obeyed by the courts’,69 the difficulty of fulfilling such a duty is not one of them.70 
As Collin J described in R v Newham ‘Parliament has imposed the duties but the authorities 
do not have the resources to fulfil them. Nevertheless, I must apply the law Parliament has 
enacted however hard that may be for the authority in question’.71 
b)  A new kind of duty: outcome duties 
Rather than being shoe-horned into an (ill-fitting) pre-existing category – of target duties – 
hard-edged and time-limited duties like those in the Act should be understood as a recent 
legislative innovation which require a fresh assessment.72 As Maurice Kay LJ acknowledged: 
‘[t]his style of legislation is of recent origin (…) [o]n any view, this is a rapidly developing 
area of public law with an obvious and concerning potential for litigation’.73 The case in 
question concerned the meaning of a statutory provision which sets a specific deadline for a 
duty to be fulfilled.74 Although it also contains qualifying language (‘as far as reasonably 
practicable’), the presence of a specific deadline was enough to distinguish the duty from a 
target duty.75 
The Act’s primary duties are a further step removed from target duties. Colin Reid 
identifies  a new, albeit (so far) uncommon, kind  of time-limited duty  which contains  no 
qualifying terms whatever.76 He terms such duties ‘outcome duties’, and the Climate Change 
Act is his leading example. Outcome duties, he argues: 
can be taken at face value as creating a new form of statutory duty, representing a 
legal innovation through the imposition of unqualified legal duties on Ministers to 
achieve  certain  outcomes  which  can  be  met  only  as  the  result  of  a  complex 
                                                 
68 David Feldman (ed), English Public Law (OUP 2004) 134-135. 
69 ibid 128. 
70 Feldman (n  68) 127-154 considers the following such exceptions: limitations on Parliament binding its 
successors and the effects of international law, the Human Rights Act 1998, and the European Communities Act 
1972. The judicial limits of Parliamentary supremacy tod ay are typically identified in terms of Parliament 
seeking to over-ride fundamental rights or subvert the rule of law (see eg Baroness Hale in  R (Jackson) v 
Attorney General [2006] 1 AC (HL) [159]). 
71 R v Newham London Borough Council (2001) 33 HLR (HC) 29, [17] (emphasis added). 
72 Reid (n 41); Annabelle Lee and Justin Leslie ,  ‘Judicial  Review  of  Target-setting  Legislation’  [2010]  15 
Judicial Review 236. 
73 R (Friends of the Earth) v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change [2009] EWCA Civ 810 [2], [19] 
74 Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act 2000, s 2. 
75 Lee and Leslie (n 72) [9].  
76 Reid also identifies the Child Poverty Act as containing outcome duties. However, since his article (n 41) was 
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aggregation of legislation, decisions, actions and public spending over an extended 
period.77 
There is, however, one final potential obstacle to the primary duties being understood as 
outcome duties: the fact that in ‘determining which claims to uphold on the merits, courts will 
almost  irresistibly  tend  to  peek  ahead  at  the  remedial  consequences  and  weigh  their 
acceptability’. 78 As  discussed  in  the  following  sections,  the  remedial  consequences  of 
enforcing a breach of a primary duty may be severe – so this could tempt a court to deny a 
claim on its merits. However this could only be achieved by ‘downgrading’ the outcome 
duties79 in the face of the kind of arguments made above which caution against it. 80 Instead, 
the appropriate response, as explored further in Section D, must be to mould the remedial 
consequences such that they are acceptable so that the duties can be given their proper effect 
as outcome duties. In what follows I assume that the Act’s primary duties will be treated as 
outcome duties – and I argue that they can and should be effectively enforced. 
2.  Contesting the consensus against enforceability 
The starting point in this scenario must be that courts will in general be predisposed to seeing 
that duties are effectively enforced.81 Indeed, ‘ensur[ing] that a public body complies with the 
law’ may be described as the ‘essential nature’ of public law proceedings.82 The novelty of 
outcome duties may require that ‘[d]ifferent paths have to be explored’83 in order that they 
are  given  their  proper  effect.  Specifically,  such  duties  ‘[shift]  the  burden  for  the 
accountability for important parts of government policy onto the courts’84 and therefore ‘there 
is  a  strong  argument  for  the  amplification  of  the  courts’  role  to  ensure  that  there  is  no 
                                                 
77 Reid (n 41) 766. 
78 Richard Fallon, ‘The linkage between justiciability and remedies – and their connections to substantive rights’ 
(2006) 92 Virginia LR 634, 642. The more widely acknowledged example of overspill is the influence of the 
merits stage on the preliminary stage, as established in R v IRC ex parte National Federation of Self-Employed 
and Small Businesses Limited [1982] AC 617. 
79 This is because, as noted in the following section, if the duties are taken to be outcome duties, the success of 
the claim on its merits follows almost automatically.  
80 This particular effect was identified in an earlier analysis of why certain duties were treated as target duties 
and not specific duties (specific duties having obvious parallels to outcome duties): ‘the artificial distinction 
between target and specific duties stems from the judiciary’s anxiety over the resource implications of their 
judgments’: L Clements, Community Care and the Law (3rd edn, Legal Action Group 2004) 11-13, quoted in 
Jeff King, ‘The Justiciability of Resource Allocation’ [2007] 70(2) MLR 197, 214. 
81 HWR Wade and CF Forsyth, Administrative Law (9th edn, OUP 2004) 589-590. Once duties are ‘sufficiently 
specific’, ‘the courts do not shrink from enforcing them’. (However, this may not always be the case: King (n 
81)). 
82 Land Securities Plc v Fladgate Fielder [2009] EWCA Civ 1402 [94]. 
83 Reid (n 41) 753. 
84 Lee and Leslie (n 72) 240. The discussion is of target -setting legislation – outcome duties form a subset of 
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[resulting] gap in accountability’.85 The courts should not feel reluctant to adapt to this new 
type  of  statutory  provision,  including  by  taking  on  an  amplified  role  if  appropriate.  For 
common law constitutionalists, ‘evolution’ and ‘experiment’ are fundamental parts of the 
common law’s ‘ethos’.86 Indeed, for those who believe that the courts ‘ought to be recognized 
as the best existing forum for moral/political deliberation’87 it will be natural that those courts 
take up the baton of political accountability. Ultra vires proponents will in general favour a 
more circumscribed judicial role since ‘the methodology of ultra vires confines the judicial 
function to the implementation of Parliament’s will’88 in a way which the common law model 
does not. However, even on this basis, there can surely be no more legitimate foundation for 
an innovative judicial response than an innovative expression of Parliament’s will – as is 
found in these outcome duties. 
In spite of the persuasive arguments of principle that favour the courts adopting an amplified 
role in response to the Act, Aileen McHarg has identified a consensus that s.1(1) will not be 
meaningfully  enforced.  Her  description  provides  a  useful  basis  for  the  discussion  that 
follows: 
The consensus is that the courts are extremely unlikely to award anything other than 
declaratory relief, since this would involve them in complex and polycentric issues of 
policy  prioritization  and  resource  allocation  which  are  typically  regarded  as  non-
justiciable. If judicial review is sought before the target/budget date has passed, the 
action might be regarded as premature; if it is brought afterwards, it might be seen as 
purely academic (…)89 
McHarg’s objections on the basis of non-justiciability are considered at a) – c); those on the 
basis of timing are dealt with at d). 
a)  Non-justiciability 
In respect of non-justiciability, McHarg appears to represent the consensus view. In their 
analyses of the Act, both Reid and Mark Stallworthy echo the reasons she gives for the non-
justiciability of the primary duties.90 However, in my view, their arguments are problematic. 
                                                 
85 ibid. 
86 John Laws, The Common Law Constitution, (CUP 2014) 7. They are two aspects of the common law’s 
‘fourfold ethos’; the others being ‘history and distillation’. 
87 Thomas Poole, ‘Back to the Future? Unearthing the Theory of Common Law Constitutionalism’ (2003) OJLS 
23(3) 435, 442. 
88 Mark Elliott, ‘The ultra vires doctrine in a constitutional setting: still the central principle of administrative 
law’ (1999) CLJ 58(1) 129, 131 (emphasis added). 
89 McHarg (n 9) 477-8. 
90 Reid (n 41) 754-5; Mark Stallworthy, ‘Prospects for the UK’s national approach to climate law-making?’ in 
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In what follows, I argue that in many respects the elements of non-justiciability they cite – 
policy  prioritisation,  polycentricity,  complexity,  and  resource  allocation  –  do  not 
convincingly apply. This is because such elements are traditionally or primarily focused upon 
the ‘merits’ stage of a case; specifically on the ‘inputs’ to a case. Yet in a case to enforce the 
Act’s primary duties, the merits stage does not exhibit these elements. As McHarg appears to 
suggest,  the  real  obstacle  to  effective  enforcement  of  the  primary  duties  is  the  lack  of 
effective and unintrusive remedies, however it is not clear to what extent (if at all) arguments 
about non-justiciability operate at this stage. 
Two characteristics of a judicial review claim in respect of an alleged breach of the 
Act’s primary duties combine to make it ‘bottom-heavy’: an unusually simple merits stage 
and an unusually complex and contentious remedies stage.91 The merits stage of such a case – 
ie  where  the  substantive  questions  of  law  are  determined  –  should,  if  considered  in 
isolation,92 be straightforward. The onl y substantive legal reasoning relates to whether a 
primary duty should be treated as an outcome duty. I have argued above that it should be. If 
so, there is no further legal test to be applied: the Secretary of State will already have 
announced the breach of a primary duty to Parliament by the time a judicial review claim to 
enforce a primary duty is brought. 93 The court will have its answer before it: either the net 
UK carbon account exceeds the carbon budget in question or it does not. Arriving at such a 
judgment will not involve complex, polycentric, or policy questions (however defined), nor 
will it go to the allocation of resources. 
By contrast, at the remedies stage the  questions facing the court will be unusually 
challenging. This is in large part because a statutory duty is in question, not a statutory power. 
As Purdue noted in his review of one of the few thorough studies into public law duties:94 
[T]he emphasis of the law on public duties is on their positive enforcement, which is 
why the topic is usually associated with the remedy of mandamus. And it is in the 
enforcement of public duties that the courts get closest to usurping the task of the 
administration.95 
                                                 
91 I take the judicial review process to comprise three stages, which I refer to as the ‘preliminary’, ‘merits’ and 
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The  contrast  is  with  remedying  an  action  taken  in  excess  of  a  decision-maker’s  powers, 
something that can usually be undone by the making of a simple quashing order.96 The courts 
will come all the closer to ‘usurping the task of the administration’ where the duty being 
enforced is an outcome duty. This is because such duties ‘can be met only as the result of a 
complex aggregation of legislation, decisions, actions and public spending over an extended 
period’.97 If  a  court’s  ordering  a  civil  servant  to  make  a  particular  order,  or  even  make 
housing or other public resources available,98 might be unduly intrusive, how can resolving a 
breach of the UK’s long-term decarbonisation target even be contemplated? Here we see 
what look like the hallmarks of non-justiciability but, as the following section argues, it is 
doubtful whether such elements of non-justiciability have any theoretical relevance when 
applied at the remedial stage. 
Whereas the shape of a claim in respect of the primary duties is ‘bottom heavy’, I 
argue in what follows that non-justiciability – specifically the elements considered here99 – is 
a decidedly ‘top-heavy’ doctrine. It asks questions primarily of the merits stage of a claim 
which,  as  we  have  seen,  does  not,  where  outcome  duties  are  at  issue,  involve  difficult 
questions. By contrast, non-justiciability says little about remedies, yet it is at this stage that 
the  challenge  of  enforcing  the  primary  duties  is  felt.  This  misalignment  undermines  any 
simple  ‘diagnosis’  of  non-justiciability  and  muddies  an  analysis  of  the  real  obstacles  to 
enforcement. 
To  be  clear,  non-justiciability  is  used  here  in  the  ‘secondary  justiciability’ 100 or 
‘judicial restraint’101 sense. It describes how, ‘in some sensitive cases’, the ‘general principles 
of judicial review’ are not applied ‘with full rigour’.102 (The distinct question of ‘jurisdiction 
… to hear a case’ applies at the preliminary stage, and incorporates questions of standing and 
timing,103 considered elsewhere. 104) While acknowledging the theoretical objections that 
                                                 
96 Feldman (n 68) 923-4. 
97 Reid (n 41) 766. 
98 Example taken from Harding (n 96) 29-30. 
99 It is possible that alternative formulations of non -justiciability could account more convincingly for the 
challenges inherent in enforcing the Ac t’s  primary  duties.  These  might  include  inter  alia  inter-institutional 
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100 To be distinguished f rom primary justiciability  –  ie  the  categories  of  decision  which  are  ‘inherently 
unreviewable’ (Woolf (n 49) 15) – which is not relevant to the current discussion: none of the powers which 
Lord Roskill identified in GHCQ ([1985] AC 374, [418]) as not being ‘susceptible to judicial review’ are at 
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might be made, the separate elements of non-justriciability cited by McHarg and others are 
now considered in turn.105 
Policy prioritisation: The distinction between principle and policy is a formalist division of 
legal  matters  into  those  that  courts  should  and  should  not  adjudicate  on.106 It has been 
criticised, for, inter alia, offering a ‘false pretence to objectivity’ and ‘disguis[ing]’ the real 
reasons  for  judicial  restraint.107 For Lord Steyn, the dividing line did not even exist in 
principle.108 Nonetheless, the distinction continues to be utilised by the courts. 109 A brief 
examination of leading cases in which the presence of policy considerations has cautioned 
against judicial intervention shows the following: it is the decision which the court is 
reviewing whose ‘policy nature’ leads to a finding of non-justiciability.110 In other words, this 
element of  non-justiciability is operating on the ‘inputs’ to a case: at the merits, not the 
remedies, stage. 
Polycentricity: ‘[A] polycentric problem is one that comprises a large and complicated web 
of interdependent relationships, such that a change to one factor produces an incalculable 
series  of  changes  to  other  factors’.111 Polycentric  disputes  are,  according  to  Lon  Fuller’s 
thesis,  unsuitable  for  adjudication  because  of  unexpected  or  complex  repercussions.112 In 
spite of this explicit concern for the effect (the re percussions) of a judgment, it seems clear 
that even polycentricity is an element of non-justiciability which primarily asks questions of 
the action being reviewed by the court, or even on who took that action, 113 rather than the 
nature of the remedy. Fuller’s leading example of a polycentric case – in which a court would 
be reluctant to intervene – is one involving the review of a (polycentric) decision to set a 
                                                 
105 Specifically,  attempting  to  ‘isolate’  individual  elements  of  non-justiciability  might  be  criticised  on  the 
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they are ‘internal to ordinary legal analysis’: TRS Allan, ‘Judicial deference and judicial review: legal doctrine 
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106 King (n 101) 416. 
107 ibid 414. 
108 Lord Steyn: ‘Deference: A Tangled Story’, 2004 Judicial Studies Board Lecture, 25 November 2004: ‘it is an 
everyday occurrence for courts to consider, together with principled arguments, the balance sheet of policy 
advantages and disadvantages’. 
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wage scale applicable to many thousands of public servants.114 Although such a review would 
indeed have wide-ranging consequences, it does not appear to be the consequences per se 
which lead to a ‘finding’ of non-justiciability. 
Jeff King has proposed a refinement of polycentricity which suggests that remedies may to 
some extent be taken into account. On this account, ‘remedial flexibility’ is one of numerous 
‘attenuating  factors’  which  ‘will  help  sculpt  the  legal  issues  such  that  the  degree  of 
polycentricity is manageable’.115 In other words, the available remedies will not on their own 
render a matter justiciable or non-justiciable, however it may be possible to make what would 
have been a non-justiciable matter into a justiciable one by choosing a remedy which softens 
the unwelcome polycentric effects of an adjudication. This still represents a minor role for 
remedies. It should also be noted that this account appears to push only in the direction of 
expanding justiciability; it does not explain how the available remedies could render a claim 
non-justiciable. 
A related consideration is stare decisis, the potential repercussions of which may also 
be relevant to a finding of non-justiciability: John Allison cites an instance where ‘the Law 
Lords [considered that they] ought not to  develop the law in complex disputes where ‘it 
would be impracticable to foresee all the consequences of tampering with it’.116 However, the 
development of the law takes place at the merits stage. Stare decisis is largely oblivious to 
remedies.117 
Complexity: The idea of complexity clearly has links with polycentricity,118 however the two 
will not necessarily go together. As King describes it, complexity may be a description of the 
kind of subject-matter which makes a case polycentric; it aligns with ‘areas’ of decision-
making  in  a  way  that  polycentricity  does  not.119 Examples of complexity i n this context 
include the adjudication of certain complex scientific questions – ie the review of something 
‘understood  with  great  difficulty’120 –  and,  similarly,  the  review  of  ‘complex  economic 
issues’.121 Remedies do not seem to be relevant. 
                                                 
114 Quoted, eg, by King (n 111) 102. 
115 King (n 22) 209-210. 
116 John  Allison,  ‘The  procedural  reason  for  judicial  restraint’,  [1994]  PL  452,  542,  quoting  Steadman  v 
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Resource  Allocation:  Here  again  the  connections  between  different  elements  of  non-
justiciability are apparent. As Paul Daly represents it, the non-justiciability of ‘the allocation 
of scarce resources’ is an application of the courts’ ‘traditional’ concerns about complexity, 
as well as institutional legitimacy.122 Both King and de Smith’s Judicial Review note the 
close connection between polycentricity and resource allocation; the latter tending to form a 
sample set of the former.123 On this analysis, the consideration of re source allocation adds 
little to the discussion. 
King adds nuance, by drawing a distinction between two types of case concerned with 
resource allocation. First, there are cases where the courts are reviewing the exercise of a 
power to allocate public resources.124 These cases, identified according to the nature of the 
‘input’  to  a  case,  will  be  non-justiciable.125 On the other hand are cases concerned with 
‘allocative impact’: ‘the financial or distributional adjustment made necessary by a court’s 
judgment’.126 Allocative impact can therefore be a function of the particular remedies ordered 
in a case (as well, potentially, as the effect of the substantive finding of law). However, King 
concludes that the presence of allocative impact does not constitute a stand-alone element of 
non-justiciability. 127 Again,  we  must  conclude  that  this  element  of  non -justiciability  – 
resource  allocation  –  operates  at  the  merits  stage  of  a  case  but  does  not  do  so  to  any 
appreciable extent at the remedies stage. 
b)  Justiciable primary duties… 
It should not be surprising that doctrines of non-justiciability have the shape that they do 
given that they have developed in the context of administrative law’s focus on powers rather 
than duties. Just as claims to enforce powers tend to be naturally ‘top-heavy’ (intense scrutiny 
of administrative action at the merits stage; relatively straightforward remedies stage) so the 
doctrines which structure these claims – such as non-justiciability – take a similar shape. The 
expansion of public law duties and therefore the expansion of claims which are ‘bottom-
heavy’ may, in the coming years, demand a change of judicial perspective. 
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However, whether it is a product of neglect or design, the apparent fact that non-
justiciability does not operate at the remedies stage of a case128 has significant implications 
for the Act’s primary duties. Since enforcement of the primary duties does not raise questions 
of non-justiciability at the merits stage, it follows that, contrary to the consensus identified by 
McHarg,129 the primary duties are not non-justiciable. 
If the primary duties are justiciable, this does not, of course, guarantee the outcome of 
a claim to enforce them. However, it does mean that, in such a claim, a court should not resile 
from applying the general principles of review with ‘full rigour’.130 On my account, a court in 
doing so should treat the primary duties as outcome duties, and, it then follows, vindicate the 
claim on its merits. It is also argued above that a court should feel entitled (if not obliged) to 
take on an amplified role in enforcing the primary duties, and this must extend to seeking to 
provide a genuinely effective remedy.131 How a court might do so is explored in detail in 
Section D, below. 
c)  …or Non-justiciable remedies 
An alternative conclusion is that a court, faced with a claim to enforce a primary duty, would 
nonetheless find it to be non-justiciable. It might seek to do so on the basis of there being an 
element of ‘overspill’ (so far little acknowledged132) by which the presence of elements of 
non-justiciability could in fact be informed by the nature of the available remedies. In other 
words, a claim might be found to be non-justiciable on the basis of a likely remedy appearing 
to be (for example) polycentric or complex in character. Indeed, there is commentary by 
Richard Fallon which posits ‘a broad linkage between the entire set of justiciability doctrines 
– including standing, mootness, ripeness, political question, and so forth – and judgments 
concerning necessary, appropriate, and acceptable judicial remedies’.133 In particular, Fallon 
asserts that remedies ‘exert a nearly ubiquitous, often unrecognized, and little understood 
                                                 
128 With the possible and partial exception of ‘polycentricity’. 
129 The contrasting framework of analysis underpinning the consensus position is apparent where Stallworthy 
notes that  the  Act’s primary duties  may be difficult to enforce because  ‘the courts are generally loathe  to 
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influence in the shaping and application of justiciability doctrines’.134 This idea forms part of 
a broader thesis135 which holds that the courts should acknowledge the interconnectedness 
between the justiciability doctrines that operate at all stages of a claim and seek an ‘optimal 
balance among them’.136 
Viewed through this lens, questions of complexity, polycentricity, or considerations 
of policy prioritisation or resource allocation, whether they arise at the remedies stage or the 
merits stage, may (rightly, according to  Fallon) influence the court’s overall approach to 
resolving the case before it. In the face of these complexities, the temptation to retreat into 
non-doctrinalism should be resisted.137 Seeking to acknowledge and elucidate the connections 
and overspills between the stages of a claim has the advantage of bringing the ‘considerations 
conditioning restraint … in[to] full view’,138 the value of which, it is hoped, can be seen in 
the present discussion. If the apparent obstacles to the effective enforcement of the Act’s 
primary duties can be demystified, the way can be made clearer for their being overcome. 
Indeed,  the  central  obstacle  can  now  be  seen:  it  is  not  the  ‘non-justiciability’  (as 
traditionally understood)139 of the primary duties, but the difficulty of finding an appropriate 
remedy.140 If a remedy can be found which  is more appropriate – or, following Fallon’s 
analysis, more ‘justiciable’ – that obstacle falls away. 
d)  Overcoming jurisdictional objections 
Before  proceeding  to  consider  remedies,  it  is  necessary  to  address  McHarg’s  concerns 
regarding the timing of a claim,141 both  in terms of prematurity  (‘ripeness’) and lateness 
(‘mootness’).142 
Ripeness: A claim brought before the end of a budgetary period to enforce a breach of a 
primary duty would not necessarily be regarded as premature.143 This is because the duties 
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are defined in terms of ‘the net UK carbon account’;144 a total permissible quantity of GHG 
emissions, which could in principle be exceeded before a budgetary period ended.145 Even if 
the net UK carbon account had not yet been exceeded, a court could entertain a judicial 
review claim if this appeared inevitable146 or if the Government conceded  that it would be 
exceeded in due course.147 
Mootness: Mootness is more likely to be a relevant concern in an action to enforce a primary 
duty. A judicial review claim must be filed ‘promptly; and (…) in any event not later than 
three months after the grounds to make the case first arose’,148 yet it will typically not be 
established by this time whether a breach has occurred. The basis of any such claim – the net 
UK carbon account – need only be published by the Secretary of State 17 months after the 
end of the relevant budgetary period.149 This is potentially problematic. However, the House 
of Lords in Anufrijeva described the rules on mootness as ‘simply an application of the right 
of  access  to  justice’,  ‘a  fundamental  and  constitutional  principle  of  our  legal  system’.150 
Rigidly applying the (already uncertain151) rules in the above circumstances would be to deny 
the right of access to justice and therefore offend the rules in principle. 
There are good reasons to think that the publicati on of the net UK carbon account 
should signal the start of the ‘3-month clock’. First, this might be analogous to ‘notice of a 
decision’; ruled in Anufrijeva to be when the case first arose.152 Second, since a primary duty 
will be breached by the effect of cumulative (in)action, it is hard to imagine what other point 
in time could be taken as the start point. Lastly, the breach itself would arguably only occur 
when the net  UK carbon account  ‘came into existence’  – presumably by its being made 
publicly available after the end of the budgetary period. Indeed, until it is published, the 
Government is able to make adjustments to the carbon account;153 potentially making good 
                                                                                                                                                        
duties might have a dual character, behaving like target duties where claims are brought during a budgetary 
period, and as outcome duties otherwise.) 
144 s 27. 
145 In practice, there may be difficulties. For example, this would require the availability of reliable emissions 
figures prior to the end of the relevant period. It would also be subject to the arguments made in the following 
section, eg text to (n 153). 
146 eg if annual data showed a significant and/or widening gap between actual emissions (s 16) and indicative 
projected emissions required to meet a carbon budget (s 12). 
147 This was the case in Friends of the Earth (n 68) [9]. 
148 Civil Procedure Rule 54.5(1). These two requirements operate independently, so the three month time limit 
functions as a ‘long-stop’: Jamie Potter and Dervla Simm, ‘Timing is Everything: When Should a Claimant 
Bring a Judicial Review Claim?’ [2013] JR 421. 
149 s 18(9); s 20(7) for 2050. 
150 R (Anufrijeva) v SoS for the Home Department [2003] UKHL 36 [26]. 
151 Potter and Simm (n 148) 421. 
152 Anufrijeva (n 150) [26]. 
153 ss 17(1),(5). Note also that s 21(3) allows for the amendment of a carbon budget during a budgetary period. UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
129 
what would otherwise constitute a breach. Whether or not, as McHarg suggests, a claim made 
after  the  end  of  a  budgetary  period  might  be  ‘purely  academic’  will  depend  upon  the 
remedies that a court is able to order; discussed in the following section. 
 
D.  FINDING AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY 
In 1973, Lord Denning said: ‘We live in an age when Parliament has placed statutory duties 
on government departments and public authorities – for the benefit of the public – but has 
provided no remedy for the breach of them’.154 Since then, remedies have failed to expand to 
fill the role required of them,155 something underlined now by the advent of outcome duties. 
As argued above, it is the unavailability of an effective and appropriate remedy which 
represents the primary challenge for the enforcement of the Act’s primary duties. There is 
also, as noted, ‘a strong argument for the amplification of the courts’ role’ to ensure that the 
primary duties are appropriately enforced,156 which must involve forging an acceptable and 
effective remedy. 
1.  Remedies under the Act 
It is first necessary to address those arguments which hold that the courts should refrain from 
ordering effective remedies in this context. Perhaps the most common basis for this view is 
that, since the Act requires the Secretary of State to report GHG emissions to Parliament 
following the end of each budgetary period,157 the intention must have been that he would be 
accountable politically rather than through the courts. 158 A general response is that, as Lord 
Diplock stated in the  IRC case, ‘[departments of central government] are responsible to a 
court of justice for the lawfulness of what they do, and of that the court is the only judge’.159 
More  specifically,  the  Government  in  the  course  of  the  Act’s  pre-legislative  scrutiny 
explicitly denied that political accountability was intended to oust legal accountability.160 
Arguably, a judicial remedy should not be awarded where a political remedy would be as 
‘convenient, beneficial and effective’.161 By this measure, however, a statement to Parliament 
would fall far short of any substantive remedy. A declaration might be comparable in these 
terms; however, such a remedy should be avoided for the reasons given below. 
                                                 
154 Attorney-General, ex rel McWhirter v Independent Broadcasting Authority [1973] QB 626 [646]. 
155 Harlow and Rawlings (n 91) 672. 
156 Lee and Leslie (n 72) 240. 
157 s 18; s 20 for 2050. 
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The  courts  should  not  be  discouraged  by  the  lack  of  ‘hard-edged’  compliance 
procedures in the Act, which might ordinarily ‘lead to an exceptional reluctance to fashion 
corrective  remedies’.162 On  the  Government’s  account,  calls  for  such  procedures163 were 
rejected because they might have interfered with an effective judicial response: ‘attempting to 
set out specific sanctions carries a risk that whatever sanction was specified might be less 
stringent  than  one  which  could  be  prescribed  by  a  court  of  law’.164 Similarly,  the  then 
Secretary of State, David Miliband MP highlighted the need for the Act to reserve for judges 
‘maximum flexibility’ to order ‘appropriate sanctions’, and the value of thereby creating an 
‘additional fear’ among ministers.165 The status of evidence given by Government in pre-
legislative scrutiny is generally far from settled.166 While in general Parliamentary material 
should not be used to aid statutory construction, 167 Government statements of the kind 
quoted, if they have any effect at all, should embolden a court to consider fashioning 
innovative and ‘stringent’ corrective remedies. 
Finally, there is a risk that a court might order a mere declaration – that a Secretary of 
State had breached a primary duty – as a remedy. However, doing so would ‘add nothing to 
the reporting provisions already in the [Act]’168 and it would risk giving the same impression 
as  awarding  no  remedy  at  all;  namely  that  the  court  was  ‘impotent  …  [since  giving  a] 
judgment not accompanied by an effectual remedy would risk that appearance’.169 For these 
reasons a declaration should be avoided. 
2.  The court’s remedies 
A  failure  to  perform  a  duty  will  generally  be  most  effectively  remedied  by  a  positive 
injunction  or  a  mandatory  order;  the  former  probably  being  preferred  on  account  of  the 
greater flexibility it would afford.170 It should be noted that there is no absolute rule against 
either being ordered directly against the Secretary of State.171 But what form of either kind of 
remedy a court might order is a matter of some speculation. A number of possible remedies 
have been suggested, some more realistic than others. These include: 
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163 DEFRA (n 7) 53. 
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i)  Ordering the Government ‘to purchase emissions credits on the open market’ 
to reduce the net UK carbon account.172 
ii)  Ordering the Government to invest in appropriate infrastructure an amount of 
money equivalent to the cost of purchasing such emissions credits, in order to 
allow future budgets to be met.173 
iii)  Ordering that ‘the excess emissions [be] deducted from the carbon budget for 
the subsequent period’.174 
iv)  Ordering financial penalties against the Government.175 
v)  Compensating persons harmed by the breach.176 
vi)  Imposing criminal sanctions against the Secretary of State.177 
vii)  Imposing a ‘40 seat penalty’ for the Governing party at the following General 
Election.178 
viii)  ‘Loss of the office of Prime Minister’.179 
The first suggestion is perhaps the most commonly cited. This would come closest to an 
enforcement  of  the  duty  in  literal  terms,  by  retrospectively  adjusting  the  net  UK  carbon 
account. It would, however, do little more than relax the constraints on the use of emissions 
credits prescribed by the Act.180 And, as with any financial penalty against the Government 
(see also proposal iv), it might be argued simply  that the ‘taxpayer was being punished’181 
(though here, at least, overall GHG emissions would be limited182). The third proposal again 
constitutes an effective relaxation of limits imposed by the Act  – in this case on how much 
excess emissions are allowed to be allocated to the subsequent budgetary period.183 While 
this remedy might be justifiable in certain circumstances, it does little more than kick the 
problem further down the road. This remedy could be used repeatedly without bringing about 
any substantive change in emissions. McMaster has noted that any award of compensation 
(proposal v) would be profoundly hindered by problems of causation even if a duty was 
                                                 
172 McMaster (n 53) 119; Macrory (n 3). 
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deemed  to  be  owed  to  all  who  might  suffer  damage;  criminal  sanctions  (proposal  vi), 
meanwhile, he considers ‘fanciful’.184 
Putting  aside  the  seventh  and  eighth  proposals 185 leaves the second proposal as 
perhaps the most attractive. First, it has a clear and definable basis: the value of carbon 
credits that would have to have been purchased to prevent the du ty being breached. It also 
avoids the pitfalls of a financial penalty, and of storing up problems for the future. It is 
constructive, rather than punitive. It may well involve ordering government expenditure, but 
this should not itself be a bar to enforcem ent.186 The difficulty comes in ordering the 
allocation  of  potentially  large  sums  of  public  money.  (What  would  ‘appropriate 
infrastructure’ be?) If notions of non-justiciability were applicable here, all of the elements 
discussed  would  apply.  To  order,  say,  a  construction  scheme  of  renewable  energy 
infrastructure would be complex; the consequences would be immense: polycentricity and 
questions  of  resource  allocation  abound.  The  court  would  be  trespassing  overtly  and 
significantly on the central political functions of Government. If, as suggested in this article, 
notions  of  non-justiciability  do  not  apply  to  remedies,  the  court  is,  in  principle,  free  to 
overlook these characteristics. However, this article has also argued that the effect of such 
characteristics might well constitute an obstacle to effective enforcement, whether described 
in terms of non-justiciability or not. 
A more creative, flexible and co-operative approach to remedies may be required. For 
example: 
i)  The court could order certain general steps to be taken, leaving the details to 
be decided by the Government.187 In this way, ‘ownership’ of the most non-
justiciable elements of a remedy might be retained by the Government. 
ii)  ‘One solution might be for the courts to evolve more flexible remedies, such 
as  requiring  a  public  authority  to  report  back  to  the  court  as  to  how  it  is 
carrying out its public duties’.188 
iii)  More  punitive  measures  could  perhaps  (at  the  same  time)  be  imposed  in 
‘suspended’ form, to allow the Government a chance to take more constructive 
remedial measures.189 
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To apply these suggestions to the example above: instead of a court ordering investment in a 
specific programme of action, it could order the Government to develop such a programme 
(perhaps within constraints outlined by the court), and to demonstrate to the court at certain 
intervals  how  that  programme  was  being  implemented.  Such  an  approach  would  not  be 
entirely without precedent.190 In the meantime, the court could allow excess emissions to be 
‘rolled forward’ into future periods (akin to proposal iii, above) so that total emissions would 
not  increase,  while  also  reserving  its  ability  to  impose  more  punitive  measures  if  the 
Government failed to comply with the court’s remedial measures by a predetermined time. 
The purpose of this example is not to second-guess what a court might order in the event that 
a carbon budget was breached, but to demonstrate that it would be within its capacity to order 
a remedy that was both constitutionally appropriate and genuinely effective. 
 
E.  CONCLUSION 
To return to Lord Denning’s quote,191 there is in general a mismatch between the extent of 
public  duties  and  the  means  that  the  courts  have  at  their  disposal  to  enforce  them.  The 
emergence  of  outcome  duties  (of  which  the  Act’s  primary  duties  are  examples)  only 
exacerbates this problem, and demands an ‘amplified’ judicial response. I have argued that 
the duties under the Act which determine how carbon budgets are set and amended should be 
interpreted  purposively.  This  will  help  to  ensure  that  the  carbon  budgets  are  anchored 
sufficiently strongly to the 2050 target. Although the obstacles to the effective enforcement of 
the  Act’s  primary  duties  are  routinely  described  by  commentators  in  terms  of  non-
justiciability, I have suggested that this framework of analysis does not, at least in its usual 
form, provide a satisfactory explanation of the real obstacles to enforcement. This is because 
non-justiciability tends not (overtly at least) to ‘operate’ at the remedies stage of a judicial 
review claim, yet it is at this stage that the obstacles to the enforcement of the Act’s primary 
duties are found. Therefore, on any analysis, the prospect of effective enforcement of the 
Act’s primary duties depends on the courts’ willingness to craft effective and appropriate 
remedies. I have sought to demonstrate that such remedies need not be beyond the capacity of 
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a court which in principle accepts the need for them. The Climate Change Act is noteworthy 
for  establishing  long-term  and  unambiguous  duties  on  the  Secretary  of  State  to  achieve 
quantified GHG emissions reductions by certain times. These duties are not only politically 
powerful, they are also capable of effective legal enforcement. 